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Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
Preface 
This paper aims to provide a review and assessment of EU competition policy control of 
regional State aid. The paper has been prepared by the European Policies Research Centre 
(EPRC) under the aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is 
a grouping of national government authorities from countries across Europe. The 
Consortium provides sponsorship for the EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and 
comparative analysis of the regional policies of European countries and the inter-
relationships with EU Cohesion and Competition policies. EoRPA members currently 
comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
 Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
 Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
 Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires 
(DIACT), Paris 
 
Germany 
 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Federal Ministry for Economics and 
Labour), Berlin 
 Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Energy of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
 
Italy 
 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
 Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
 Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
 Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
 Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
 The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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(United Kingdom) 
 Dr Katja Mirwaldt (Luxembourg) 
 Fiona Wishlade and Frederike Gross 
(France) 
 Laura Polverari (Italy) 
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Mirwaldt (Belgium) 
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Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since Autumn 2008, European Commission control of State aids has operated against the 
backdrop of unprecedented economic turmoil. The upheaval in the financial markets has 
affected not only credit institutions themselves, necessitating massive government support, 
but has also spilt over into the so-called ‘real’ economy. The severity of the crisis has 
prompted fears of protectionist policies to preserve national champions as well as concerns 
at whether the whole edifice of the single market could withstand the impact of the crisis 
and whether the authority of the Commission in matters of State aid could survive the 
onslaught of demands from Member States.  
The Commission has responded to exceptional events with exceptional measures. For the 
first time, extensive use has been made of Article 87(3)(b), which enables aid to “remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. This has been used as the basis for 
special temporary measures to support both the banking sector and the wider economy. 
Regional aid policy has remained largely immune from this; the Commission has resisted 
requests to relax regional aid control and it has refused the use of Article 87(3)(b) for 
measures restricted to particular regions. Regional aid spending has probably fallen in the 
last year as firms retrenched rather than expanded their activities. Moreover, regional 
policy considerations per se have not been high on the agenda – instead, the emphasis has 
been on addressing problems where they occur, rather than in relation to a preordained 
map of assisted areas; it is not yet clear what new patterns of spatial inequality might 
emerge as the recession recedes. 
State aid to address the crisis has dominated the Commission agenda in the past year or so. 
However, it has continued to follow its ‘road map’ for reform in the shape of the 2005-09 
State Aid Action Plan. For regional aid policy, an important component of this has been the 
introduction of a ‘more economic approach’ to the treatment of large investment aids, 
reflected in the publication of the Commission’s Guidance on how it will handle such cases. 
Commission persistence with this agenda suggests that it anticipates an orderly return to 
standard State aid control.  
Against the backdrop of the turmoil created by the financial and economic crisis, the final 
section aims to draw out a number of issues as the basis for further consideration.  
 Perceptions of the Commission’s performance in controlling State aids in the crisis 
has been mixed, but so far broadly positive 
 Most commentators consider that intervention in the banking sector is justified; there 
is less consensus regarding other sectors 
 Policing State aid in other sectors, especially the motor industry, is likely to prove a 
significant challenge  
 The implications of the crisis for regional aid as Europe emerges from recession are 
uncertain 
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 A ‘business as usual’ approach to regional aid control may constrain regional policy in 
the post-recession period 
 The long-term implications of the economic crisis for State aid control are unclear. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since Autumn 2008, European Commission control of State aids has operated against the 
backdrop of unprecedented economic turmoil. The upheaval in the financial markets has 
affected not only credit institutions themselves, necessitating massive government support, 
but has also spilt over into the so-called ‘real’ economy. 
The severity of the crisis has prompted fears of protectionist policies to preserve national 
champions as well as concerns at whether the whole edifice of the single market could 
withstand the impact of the crisis and whether the authority of the Commission in matters 
of State aid could survive the onslaught of demands from Member States.  
The Commission has responded to exceptional events with exceptional measures. For the 
first time, extensive use has been made of Article 87(3)(b), which enables aid to “remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. This has been used as the basis for 
special temporary measures to support both the banking sector and the wider economy. 
At one level, regional aid policy has remained largely immune from this; the Commission 
has resisted requests to broaden the scope of regional aid, for example, by extending the 
assisted area maps; it has also refused the use of Article 87(3)(b) for measures restricted to 
particular regions. On the other hand, the measures authorised by the Commission in 
response to the crisis can be applied in the assisted areas as elsewhere. The temporary 
nature of the crisis measures and the use of a separate legal basis for authorisation has 
meant the creation of a ‘parallel universe’ for State aids to address the financial and 
economic crisis involving volumes of aid that dwarf regional policy expenditure.  
The longer-term implications of the crisis are difficult to predict on any level. The last 
decade or so has seen a decline in the use of subsidies, partly in response to Commission 
pressures but also because of domestic concerns about their negative impacts, their cost to 
the public purse and doubts about their efficiency. The events of the past year will 
dramatically reverse recent expenditure trends, but it remains to be seen whether the 
expiry of the temporary provisions in 2010 will mark a return to previous patterns of total 
aid spending. At the same time, regional aid spending has probably fallen in the last year as 
firms retrenched rather than expanded their activities. Moreover, regional policy 
considerations per se have not been high on the agenda – instead, the emphasis has been on 
addressing problems where they occur, rather than in relation to a preordained map of 
assisted areas; it is not yet clear what new patterns of spatial inequality might emerge as 
the recession recedes. 
In the last year, the main focus of EU competition policy in relation to State aids has been 
on measures to address the financial and economic crisis. This is reflected in Section 2 of 
this paper which outlines the regulatory framework for these measures and gives an 
indication of overall levels of spend. Regional aid has not been a major component of the 
recovery packages of the Member States and in most countries regional aid spending 
continues to decline. Nevertheless, there are wide variations between the Member States, 
on which the Commission partly bases its action on regional aid control. Section 3 provides 
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an overview of regional aid spending, setting it in the context of the crisis measures, and 
considers to what extent Member States have used regional aid in response to the crisis. 
State aid to address the crisis has dominated the Commission agenda in the past year or so. 
However, it has continued to follow its ‘road map’ for reform in the shape of the 2005-09 
State Aid Action Plan. For regional aid policy, an important component of this has been the 
introduction of a ‘more economic approach’ to the treatment of large investment aids. The 
long-awaited publication of the Commission’s Guidance on how it will handle such cases is 
discussed in Section 4, along with an overview of large regional aid cases since 2002. 
Against the backdrop of major competition policy concessions in response to the crisis, but 
firm controls on regional aid, Section 5 aims to identify some issues and questions as a basis 
for further discussion.  
2. STATE AID AND THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Since autumn 2008 the European Commission has acted swiftly and decisively in reframing 
the State aid rules to take account of the economic and financial crisis; the Commissioner 
has been keen to stress that the State aid rules should be ‘part of the solution, not part of 
the problem’,1 in rhetoric that has been echoed in numerous presentations by DG 
Competition staff in the past months. 
From a legal perspective, recent policy developments represent a major departure from 
past practice: measures to address the crisis have been based on Article 87(3)(b) of the 
Treaty, which states that: 
“Aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” [may 
be compatible with the common market]. 
This provision has scarcely been applied in the history of the Community;2 indeed the 
Commission and the Court have resisted its use, maintaining, for example, that the effects 
of German reunification on the national economy were insufficiently serious to justify its 
application. A key point to note is that, unlike Article 87(3)(c), Article 87(3)(b) makes no 
mention of the need to take account of the “common interest”.  
In present circumstances, the deployment of Article 87(3)(b) is not only clearly appropriate, 
given the magnitude of the crisis, but also has the major benefit of separating measures 
aimed at the addressing the crisis from the existing State aid framework, which remains 
unchanged. All the measures introduced in the context of the crisis are end-dated, which 
should, from a legal point of view at least, ease the return to the standard rules in due 
course.  
                                                 
1 Neelie Kroes (2009) EU state aid rules – part of the solution, EStALI conference, Luxembourg, 5 
December. 
2 It has been used in two instances in Greece; the provision on major projects has been invoked more 
frequently, for example in the case of the Channel tunnel rail link.  
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 73  European Policies Research Centre 3
Since October 2008 and based on Article 87(3)(b), the Commission has introduced a number 
of Communications setting out its approach to State aid in the crisis. Four of these concern 
the financial sector; a fifth, the so-called ‘real’ economy. This section provides a brief 
overview of measures to address the financial crisis (2.1) and the economic crisis (2.2)  
2.1 Intervention in the financial sector 
In the course of 2007 a number European banks were affected by the beginnings of the 
financial crisis in the US. As a result, the Commission dealt with a number of individual 
State aid cases from the summer of 2007. These included Sachsen LB and IKB, Northern 
Rock, West LB, Roskilde Bank, Hypo Real Estate and Bradford & Bingley. These were 
assessed under the standard rescue and restructuring aid guidelines.3 However, the 
deepening financial crisis, precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers and its 
aftermath, led to the need to intervene systemically in the banking sector, as well as in 
individual cases of difficulty. In October 2008, Member State governments agreed to 
implement national rescue packages in order to safeguard the stability of the banking 
sector, restore the normal functioning of the wholesale credit markets and sustain the 
supply of credit to the economy. These were subject to the following principles:4 
“support must in principle be temporary; the Member States will be watchful 
regarding the interests of taxpayers; existing shareholders should bear the due 
consequences of the intervention; governments should be in a position to bring 
about a change of management; management should not retain undue benefits; 
governments may have inter alia the power to intervene in remuneration; the 
legitimate interests of competitors must be protected, in particular through the 
state aids rules; negative spillover effects must be avoided.” 
Against this background, the Commission moved to apply Article 87(3)(b), introducing a 
number of Communications over the course of 2008 and 2009, enabling it to authorise far-
reaching intervention.  
This section begins by outlining the main regulatory steps taken by the Commission with 
respect to the financial sector before going on to attempt some assessment of the scale of 
intervention involved. 
2.1.1 The regulatory framework for financial sector support 
In the State aid arena, the Commission has taken four steps to address the financial crisis; 
all of these are temporary – in principle they are applicable until end 2010, subject to 
review – and based on Article 87(3)(b). The EFTA Surveillance Authority has taken 
equivalent steps in respect of the EEA Member States, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.5  
                                                 
3 Communication from the Commission — Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty, OJEU C 244/2 of 1 October 2004 (as amended - extended to October 
2012). 
4 ECOFIN Council Meeting No 2894 of 7 October 2008, 13784/09. 
5 See: http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldstateaid/state_aid_guidelines/ Part VIII. 
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First, on 13 October 2008, the Commission adopted the so-called ‘Banking 
Communication’.6 This aimed to stop or prevent runs on financial institutions by setting out 
guidance on how Member States could support the banking sector in ways which were 
compatible with the State aid rules. Based on Article 87(3)(b), it provided for swift 
authorisation of support such as guarantees or recapitalisation, provided it was well-
targeted, proportionate to the objective of stabilising the financial markets and contained 
certain safeguards against negative effects on competition – such as, for example, non-
discrimination on nationality grounds.  
Second, on 5 December 2008, the Commission adopted the ‘Recapitalisation 
Communication’7 which complemented and refined the Banking Communication. The 
Communication aimed to take account of the growing impact of the financial crisis on the 
‘real’ economy, leading to even financially-sound banks requiring State capital in order to 
ensure adequate levels of lending to firms. The Communication distinguishes between 
‘sound’ and ‘distressed’ banks (those whose business model has brought about a risk of 
insolvency), requiring greater safeguards, thorough restructuring and higher remuneration 
in return for capital injections for ‘distressed’ banks. More generally, the Communication 
reinforced the need to prevent State capital being used to fund aggressive commercial 
behaviour to the detriment of un-aided competitors. 
Third, on 25 February 2009, the Commission provided guidance on the treatment of what it 
termed ‘impaired assets’, such as underperforming loans, US sub-prime mortgage backed 
securities and other ‘toxic’ assets. The Impaired Assets Communication8 addresses the 
‘clean-up’ phase of financial institutions’ balance sheets by outlining various mechanisms to 
ensure that foreseeable losses are disclosed and properly handled in order to restore 
confidence in the banking sector and enable capital to be used to resume normal lending in 
the real economy rather than as a cushion against possible losses. These mechanisms 
include ‘bad banks’ and assets insurance schemes. The Communication sets out the 
budgetary and regulatory implications of asset relief measures and the application of the 
State aid rules to them. In particular, it provides methodologies for the valuation of 
impaired assets, the remuneration for asset relief and criteria to be used for evaluating the 
State aid given.  
Fourth, on 23 July 2009, the Commission presented guidelines on restructuring aid to 
banks.9 The Commission is dealing with a number of individual cases of bank restructuring, 
                                                 
6 Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJEU No. 
C270/8 of 25 October 2008. 
7 Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions 
of competition, OJEU C10/2 of 15 January 2009. 
8 Communication from the Commission - Treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking 
sector, not yet published in the OJEU, but available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/impaired_assets.pdf  
9 The adoption of the text will be formalised through publication in the OJEU, in the meantime, it is 
available here: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/restructuring_paper_en.pdf  
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following on from rescue measures which were approved on condition that a restructuring 
plan would follow within six months. The guidelines aim to ensure the transparency and 
predictability of the Commission decisions, which are based on three key principles. First, 
that aided banks must be viable in the long term, without further State aid. This means 
that, in devising future strategies, banks will have to undergo a so-called ‘stress test’ 
involving a diagnosis of strengths and weaknesses, which may include disclosing and dealing 
with impaired assets and even the consideration of whether takeover or winding-up is the 
most appropriate action. The second principle is that banks and their owners must bear a 
fair share of the restructuring costs; this requires, in particular, that the State is, at some 
stage, adequately remunerated for the aid provided. The third principle is that the 
distortion of competition should be limited. The Communication notes that approval of 
State support may be conditional on structural measures, such as divestitures, or 
behavioural measures such as constraints on acquisitions or on aggressive pricing and 
marketing strategies and that it will pay particular attention to national market structures. 
2.1.2 The scale of intervention in the financial sector 
Between October 2008 and July 2009, the European Commission approved a range of 
national schemes for the banking sector, notably in the form of guarantees and 
recapitalisation as well as ad hoc interventions. The total volume of approved guarantee 
measures runs to some €2,900 billion,10 with a further €313 billion on recapitalisation. In 
addition, many Member States have notified other specific measures, such as asset relief 
and direct lending to banks. The scale of the intervention involved expressed as a 
proportion of GDP is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The total volume of crisis measures for the financial sector approved by the Commission 
amounts to around one-third of EU27 GDP.11 Two points should be made about this figure. 
First, it refers to the intervention approved, not to that actually taken up; at mid-May 
2009, the support taken up stood at 12.6 percent of EU27 GDP. Second, this figure 
represents the overall maximum amount of guarantee umbrellas, rescue and restructuring 
packages and other measures approved; this is different from the State aid element, the 
value of which can only be calculated ex post. Nevertheless, these volumes are striking: 
intervention approved runs to around a third of EU GDP, while the EU budget own resources 
ceiling is just 1.24 percent of EU GNI; in just five months, Member States committed more 
to ad hoc interventions in banks (€400 billion)12 than is allocated to EU Cohesion policy for 
seven years (€347 billion); and the scale of this exposure - totalling over €3 trillion – dwarfs 
annual State aid expenditure of around €49 billion or 0.4% of EU GDP in 2007. 
In general, intervention has been heavily concentrated in the EU15 countries, all of which 
have taken action. Among the new Member States, only Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia have 
                                                 
10 Excluding the approved Italian scheme, for which no sum was given.  
11 This is an estimate since the Italian guarantee figure is unknown.  
12 This excludes the early cases such as Bradford & Bingley, Northern Rock, Sachsen LB, etc which 
predated the crisis package. 
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deployed measures for the banking sector.13 Guarantee schemes have been the most widely 
used instrument. From October 2008 until mid-July 2009, the Commission approved 11 
guarantee schemes, six recapitalisation schemes and five combination schemes. A further 
40 ad hoc interventions have been approved. Ad hoc cases may occur either because no 
scheme is or was in place when intervention was required, or because the recipient could 
not meet all of the criteria set out in the relevant Communication.  
Figure 1: Approved public intervention in the banking sector - % of GDP 
 Approved measures to 17 July 2009 
 Capital 
injections 
Guarantees Impaired 
assets relief 
Liquidity 
and bank 
funding 
Total  
Effective 
total to mid-
May 2009 
Austria 5.0 25.7 0.4 1.6 32.8 8.7 
Belgium 5.3 76.6 10.1 n/a 92.0 26.7 
Bulgaria       
Cyprus       
Czech Rep       
Denmark 6.1 253.0  0.3 259.4 0.5 
Estonia       
Finland  27.7   27.7 0.0 
France 1.2 16.6 0.2  18.1 5.6 
Germany 4.4 18.6 1.4  24.4 9.1 
Greece 2.0 6.1   11.4 4.6 
Hungary 1.1 5.9  3.3 7.1 2.7 
Ireland 6.6 225.2   231.8 229.4 
Italy 1.3 n/a   n/a 0.0 
Latvia 1.4 25.7  10.9 37.9 8.9 
Lithuania       
Luxembourg 6.9 12.4  0.9 20.2 8.8 
Malta       
Netherlands 6.4 34.3 3.9 7.5 52.0 25.4 
Poland       
Portugal 2.4 10.0   12.5 3.3 
Romania       
Slovakia       
Slovenia  32.8   32.8 0.4 
Spain  9.3  2.8 12.1 5.0 
Sweden 1.6 48.5  0.1 50.2 8.9 
UK 3.5 21.7  16.4 41.6 26.8 
EU27 2.6 24.8 0.8 2.9 31.2 12.6 
Norway 6.5      
Note: Approved measures cut-off date 17 July 2009; effective total is provisional, cut-off 
date mid-May. 
Source: DG Competition (2009) DG Competition’s review of guarantee and recapitalisation 
schemes in the financial sector in the current crisis, 7 August. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/review_of_schemes_en.pdf; Own 
calculations for Norway based on EFTA Surveillance Authority decision no 205/09/COL and 
Eurostat data. 
                                                 
13 As this paper went to print, the Commission approved measures for the financial sector in Poland – 
see: Rapid Press Release (2009) State aid: Commission approves Polish support scheme for financial 
institutions, IP/09/1360, 25 September. 
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The scale of intervention varies widely between countries. In Denmark and Ireland, for 
example, the potential exposure of the public purse is more than double national GDP; by 
contrast, in other EU15 countries, exposure is comparatively modest – in France, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain it is less than 20 percent of GDP. Clearly the ranking changes when sums 
are viewed in absolute terms because of the different sizes of national economies. Some 
estimates of the absolute amounts are given in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Estimated intervention in financial sector (€ billion) 
 Approved measures to 17 July 2009 Effective total to mid-May ‘09 
United Kingdom 756.9 487.6 
Germany 606.9 226.4 
Denmark 603.1 1.2 
Ireland 421.6 417.2 
France 352.6 109.1 
Belgium 316.4 91.8 
Netherlands 309.9 151.4 
Sweden 165.0 29.3 
Spain 132.5 54.8 
Austria 92.4 24.5 
Finland 51.1 0.0 
Greece 27.7 11.2 
Portugal 20.8 5.5 
Italy 20.4 0.0 
Slovenia 12.2 0.1 
Latvia 8.7 2.1 
Hungary 7.5 2.9 
Luxembourg 7.4 3.2 
Norway 5.1 n/a 
Note: There is no figure for the following: Italian guarantees approved; Luxembourg 
guarantees granted; and liquidity and bank funding support in Belgium (either approved or 
granted). Data for these countries under the corresponding heads (approved or effective) is 
therefore an underestimate. 
Source: Own estimates from Figure 1 and Eurostat data. 
Figure 2 suggests that the UK ‘led’ the ranking both in terms of approved amounts and the 
actual uptake of measures by May this year; Germany and Denmark follow relatively closely 
in terms of sums approved. However, the scale of support for the banking sector in Ireland 
is particularly striking, with guarantees actually granted running to around €400 billion, 
more than double national GDP. 
The take-up rate (the actual use of the measure relative to the budget committed) is 
significantly higher for recapitalisation schemes (54.8 percent) than for guarantees (32.8 
percent). However, DG Competition notes that this is a preliminary indicator of the 
adequacy of a measure. Low take up rates for guarantees may be due to the amounts 
budgeted exceeding needs or ease of access to funds on the market. More generally, the 
very presence of a scheme may be effective in restoring financial stability, even without 
take-up, since it provides reassurance of government commitment to support the sector. 
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2.2 Temporary measures in response to the economic crisis 
In December 2008, the Commission adopted a Temporary Framework for State aid measures 
to support access to finance in the crisis.14 As for the financial sector, the measures are 
based on Article 87(3)(b), which enables the Commission to authorise measures to “remedy 
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” [emphasis added]. Reflecting 
this, some subnational governments (such as Scotland and Vlaanderen) had proposals for 
such measures turned down on the basis that the conditions in the ‘economy of the Member 
State’ constituted the underlying justification for any authorisation – although clearly there 
are also administrative benefits to the Commission in terms of the potential number of 
notifications. An equivalent package has been adopted by the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
in respect of EEA States.15 
2.2.1 The regulatory framework for economic crisis measures 
The framework has two main objectives: (i) to allow measures that unblock bank lending to 
firms and thereby guarantee continuity in access to finance; and (ii) to facilitate aid 
schemes that encourage continued investment, especially in sustainable growth. Proposed 
measures must be notified and approved by the Commission prior to implementation, but 
thereafter individual aid within the terms of the approved scheme can be offered 
immediately and without further notification. 
Under the framework, a number of conditions apply: 
 all measures apply only to firms which were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008; they may 
apply to firms which entered into difficulties thereafter as a consequence of the 
economic and financial crisis; 
 all measures are applicable to 31 December 2010; 
 approved temporary measures may not be cumulated with de minimis aid in respect of 
the same eligible expenditure; 
 approved temporary measures may be cumulated with other compatible aid or with 
other forms of Community financing, provided that the maximum aid intensities in the 
relevant guidelines or General Block Exemption Regulation are respected. 
The Temporary Framework comprises both new instruments and the (temporary) 
modification of existing instruments. The key forms of aid which can be authorised under 
the framework are as follows. 
 A lump sum of up to €500,000 per undertaking. This is only applicable to aid schemes 
(as opposed to ad hoc intervention). Firms in fisheries sectors and in primary production 
                                                 
14 The consolidated version including the February 2009 amendments is published as Temporary 
Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial 
and economic crisis, OJEU No C 83/1 of 7 April 2009.  
15 See: http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldstateaid/state_aid_guidelines/ Part VIII. 
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of agricultural products are ineligible as is support for exporting. If the undertaking has 
already received de minimis aid (broadly a maximum of €200,000 over three years)16 
prior to the entry into force of the temporary framework, the sum of the aid received 
under this measure and the de minimis aid received must not exceed €500,000 between 
1 January 2008 and 31 December 2010. 
 State guarantees for loans at a reduced premium. The reduction is up to 25 percent for 
SMEs and 15 percent for large firms on the annual premium calculated in accordance 
with the ‘safe harbour’ provisions annexed to the Framework or a methodology already 
accepted by the Commission.17 The loan must not exceed the wage bill of the firm, and 
the guarantee may not exceed 90 percent of the loan. 
 Subsidised interest rates. The rate which the Commission will accept must be at least 
equal to the central bank overnight rate, plus a premium equal to the difference 
between the average one year interbank rate and the average of the central bank 
overnight rate over the period 1 January 2007 to 30 June 2008, plus the credit risk 
premium corresponding to the risk profile of the recipient.18 This method can apply to 
all contracts concluded until 31 December 2010 and may cover loans of any duration. 
The reduced interest rates may be applied for interest payments before 31 December 
2012. 
 Soft loans for ‘green’ products. The same methodology applies as for subsidised 
interest rates, but there is an interest rate reduction of 25 percent for large firms and 
50 percent for SMEs for loans to finance the production of new products that 
significantly improve environmental protection.  
 Risk capital. The Framework provides for a temporary derogation from the Risk Capital 
Guidelines19 in respect of the size of investment per target enterprise and the 
proportion of private participation. The maximum investment is raised from €1.5 
million to €2.5 million; while the minimum private participation in firms in non-assisted 
areas is lowered from 50 percent to 30 percent – ie. to the same level as firms in 
assisted areas. 
 Export credit insurance. The Framework allows for the simplification of the 
requirements of the export credit Communication.20 This Communication includes an 
                                                 
16 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 
and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJEU No L379/5 of 28 December 2006.  
17 Notably in the context of the GBER, where approval of calculation methodologies may render 
otherwise ‘intransparent’ aid transparent. 
18 As stipulated in the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting 
the reference and discount rates, OJEU No C14/6 of 19 January 2008. 
19 Community guidelines on state aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, OJEU No C 194/2 of 18 August 2006. 
20 Communication of the Commission to the Member States pursuant to Article 93 (1) of the EC 
Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short-term export- credit insurance, OJEC No C 
281/4 of 17 September 1997, as amended.   
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‘escape clause’ which, in certain circumstances, enables temporarily non-marketable 
risks to be covered by the State.  
2.2.2 The scale of intervention under economic crisis measures 
Since the introduction of the Framework a large number of measures have been approved 
by the Commission. These are summarised in Figure 3 along with the budgets committed, 
where this information is available. 
Figure 3 suggests that the uptake of the package by Member States generally has been high. 
By end July, the Commission had approved measures in all but three Member States – 
Bulgaria, Cyprus and Poland being the exceptions.21 However, there are wide variations in 
the use made of the Framework. Almost all countries have introduced schemes, or amended 
existing schemes, to take account of what is often termed the new de minimis ceiling of 
€500,000,22 but this measure has not been taken up in Belgium, Denmark, Romania or 
Sweden. Moreover, in both Sweden and Denmark quite a restrictive approach has been 
taken: the Danish response is limited to an export credit insurance mechanism; and in 
Sweden there are no measures of general application at all, with the guarantee scheme 
cited in the table being specific to Volvo.  
Several countries – France, Germany and the UK, for example – make use of most or all of 
the provisions of the Temporary Framework. However, use of some instruments is quite 
limited: only France, Germany, Spain and the UK have implemented the soft loan provisions 
for ‘green’ products; only Austria, France, Germany and Italy are using the temporary risk 
capital facility; and only Denmark, Finland, Germany and Luxembourg make use of the 
export credit mechanism.  
The scale of intervention is difficult to assess. This is partly because the amounts to be 
committed were not always known when the schemes were notified and approved and 
partly because some schemes are open-ended and/or expenditure cannot be calculated ex 
ante. This applies, for example, to many of the French schemes, the precise operation of 
which has been adjusted in line with the framework and which involve concessions on taxes 
paid to local authorities, where lost revenue is later reimbursed by central government. A 
further complication is the lack of precise information about the budgets committed for 
guarantees; it is not always apparent whether the figures given refer to the total amounts 
guaranteed or to the aid element therein.  
Notwithstanding the gaps in the data available, overall expenditure under the framework 
appears to be significant, albeit with variations between countries. Figure 3 implies that at 
least €17 billion are being committed under the ‘temporary de minimis’ facility and that 
total commitments exceed €51 billion. These figures exclude a large number of schemes – 
                                                 
21 On 17 August 2009 the Commission approved support under the framework for Poland, but no 
details are yet available. 
22 In reality, this is a misnomer since de minimis aid falls outside the scope of Article 87(1), whereas 
the limited amount of aid under the Temporary Framework does not. 
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including most or all of those in France and Italy, among others, so that this sum is a 
substantial underestimate of total commitments.  
Figure 3: Measures approved for the ‘real’ economy (€m) as at end August 2009 
  €500,000 Guarantee Soft loan Green prods 
Risk 
capital 
Export 
credit Total 
Case N47a    N47d   Austria 
Budget 10000    25  10025 
Case  N117      Belgium 
Budget  1500     1500 
Case N236  N237     Czech 
Budget 1000  97    1097 
Case      N198  Denmark 
Budget      n/a n/a 
Case N387       Estonia 
Budget n/a      n/a 
Case N224 N82b    N258  Finland 
Budget 250 n/a    n/a 250+ 
Case N7 N23 N15 N11 N119 N36   France 
Budget n/a n/a n/a 500 n/a  500+ 
Case N668 N27 N661 N38 N426 N39 N384  Germany 
Budget 2000 6000 6750 n/a 50 n/a 14800+ 
Case N304 N308 N309     Greece 
Budget n/a 500 500    1000+ 
Case N77 N144 N203 N78     Hungary 
Budget n/a 7600 n/a    7600+ 
Case N186       Ireland 
Budget 100      100 
Case N248 N266 N268  N279   Italy 
Budget n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a 
Case N124 N139      Latvia 
Budget 29 357     286 
Case N272       Lithuania 
Budget 43      43 
Case N99 N128    N50  Lux 
Budget 15 500    25 540 
Case N118       Malta 
Budget 40      40 
Case N156       Neths 
Budget n/a      n/a 
Case N13       Portugal 
Budget 750      750 
Case  N286      Romania 
Budget  n/a     n/a 
Case N222       Slovakia 
Budget 400      400 
Case N228 NN34      Slovenia 
Budget n/a n/a     n/a 
Case N307   N140    Spain 
Budget 1400   100   1500 
Case  N80      Sweden 
Budget  n/a     n/a 
Case N43 N71 N257 N72    UK 
Budget 1159 3089 3089 3089   10426 
Total EU  17186+ 19546+ 10436+ 3789+ 75+ 25+ 51057+ 
Case 235/09       Norway 
Budget n/a       
Note: Where a budget applies to several schemes, it is divided equally between them for the purposes 
of this table. 
Source: Compiled from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 73  European Policies Research Centre 11
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 73  European Policies Research Centre 12
Policymaker reactions to the temporary framework have been mixed. Some have considered 
the package to be something of a ‘sell out’, enabling generous support with very little in 
the way of constraints on eligible expenditure or other conditions, noting, for example, 
that €500,000 is a substantial sum in ‘untied’ aid at least for SMEs. Others have argued that 
the complexity of the package essentially discriminates against small firms who will be 
unwilling / unable to juggle the change in criteria and rates that will apply when the 
temporary package expires. Others still, especially at the subnational level, have bemoaned 
the complicated calculations required for setting award values, notably for soft loans, and 
have argued that this has undermined the usefulness of the package. More generally, there 
is evidence that some countries have experienced significant delays in implementation, 
partly owing to domestic administrative arrangements (and budgetary constraints), but also 
due to the complexity of the measures. 
At this juncture, it is difficult to know what the uptake of the measures is, or is likely to 
be. An important point to note is that the package is intended for firms that have 
encountered difficulties as a result of the economic and financial crisis, and not those that 
were already experiencing problems. On this basis, for example, the German authorities 
refused support to Arcandor,23 the retail and travel group, under the temporary framework 
– although assistance was later secured on the basis of the standard rules applicable to 
rescue and restructuring for its wholly-owned subsidiary Quelle.24 
Many of the high profile cases of aid, or potential aid, have involved the motor industry. As 
part of a wide-ranging package for the sector,25 the French government committed loans of 
€6.5 billion at an interest rate of six percent over five years to Peugeot and Renault; these 
were agreed with the Commission following a high-level political dispute amid concerns 
that the package contained protectionist elements. In Germany, the prospect of State aid 
has apparently been a key issue in the negotiations over the sale of Opel.26 In the UK, 
rescue aid for LDV in the form of a modest bridging loan was not provided under the 
temporary framework and was deemed to be unnotified aid by the European Commission, 
although ultimately the Commission concluded that it was compatible with the Treaty. On 
the other hand, Tata Motors, the owner of Jaguar Land Rover eschewed government 
support when it dropped a request, allegedly involving some £800 million, for government 
funding on the basis that commercial financing was available on less onerous terms.27 If 
nothing else, these examples serve to show how highly politicised the use of State aid in 
the current climate has become.  
                                                 
23 Financial Times (2009) German state aid, 23 June.  
24 Rapid Press Release (2009) State aid: Commission approves €50 million rescue aid loan to German 
retailer Quelle, IP/09/1062 of 30 June.  
25 Présidence de la République (2009) Pacte Automobile¸ 9 February.   
26 Financial Times (2009) General Motors Europe, 21 August.  
27 Financial Times (2009) Tata drops plea for State aid to Jaguar, 12 August. 
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3. STATE AID CONTROL, REGIONAL POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
By contrast with Commission action to address the turmoil in the banking sector and its 
wider economic fallout, developments in the control of regional aid have been very low 
key. This is partly because a reconsideration of the Regional Aid Guidelines for the post-
2013 period is still premature and maps and schemes are largely settled for the remainder 
of the period, and partly because the Commission has expressly favoured new temporary 
instruments to address the crisis rather than relaxing the use of existing measures. At the 
same time, at the national level, current evidence is that the regional implications of the 
crisis are not high on the agenda, and it remains to be seen whether the general measures 
taken in response to the crisis will accelerate the long-term decline in regional aid spending 
or lead to a reappraisal of the use of financial incentives. 
Against this background this section begins with some general observations on regional aid 
spending and goes on to consider what role regional incentives have played in addressing 
the economic crisis. 
3.1 Regional aid spending in perspective 
Earlier sections of this report have drawn attention to the scale of potential spending in 
response to the financial and economic crisis. The outturn of the commitments made is 
currently highly uncertain, but it can be said that the exposure of the public purse is 
unprecedented.  
European Commission estimates suggest that the measures approved for the banking sector 
amount to between €3 trillion and €4 trillion; of this the bulk is in the form of guarantees 
and it remains to be seen what calls are made on these. In addition, the commitments 
made under the temporary framework run to over €51 billion, with budget estimates 
unavailable in many cases, mainly because expenditure will be committed at the 
subnational level or because it takes the form of tax revenue foregone.  
Alongside these sums, regional aid expenditure appears exceedingly modest. According to 
Commission scoreboard figures, in 2007 regional aid spending amounted to just €9.8 billion 
for the EU27 as a whole (see Figure 4); less than a fifth of the commitments under the 
Temporary Framework and a minute fraction of that for the financial sector. Of course, 
these data need to be treated with considerable caution and are not suitable for direct 
comparisons. In particular, the regional aid data, in principle, concern actual payments 
under regional aid schemes rather than commitments; in all probability, the level of 
commitments (which would have been spread over a number of earlier years) would have 
been considerably higher. In addition, the aggregate nature of the data means that not only 
is it not possible to know to which schemes the expenditure relates, but also that the data 
may not be strictly comparable since they rely on national (or even subnational) 
classifications of the primary purpose of the aid. Notwithstanding these caveats, it is 
undeniable that the orders of magnitude of spending on the crisis and regional aid spending 
are vastly different. 
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Figure 4: Regional aid expenditure 2002-07 (€ million) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU27 11318 9690 9011 8985 9671 9869
EU15 10505 8840 8150 7941 8483 8822
NMS12 813 850 860 1045 1189 1047
Austria 87 112 79 94 110 10
Belgium 559 169 168 120 166 57
Bulgaria 19 30 23 19 24 16
Cyprus 29 2 7 5 6 4
Czech Rep 83 91 118 255 264 300
Denmark 10 5 3 5 4 0
Estonia 6 2 3 3 2 2
Finland 56 51 54 78 74 46
France 1073 897 916 1251 1533 2484
Germany 3584 3267 2788 2696 3109 2216
Greece 322 290 351 258 299 476
Hungary 231 246 211 294 179 236
Ireland 151 99 84 129 122 109
Italy 2465 1635 1184 1194 1079 701
Latvia 11 8 22 22 19 24
Lithuania 3 12 16 19 17 9
Luxembourg 43 32 15 13 7 9
Malta - - - - - -
Netherlands 130 72 33 27 23 64
Poland 142 218 211 197 415 296
Portugal 37 49 69 42 39 108
Romania 223 107 106 47 61 11
Slovakia 58 122 135 140 153 117
Slovenia 10 13 10 44 48 31
Spain 1233 1179 1079 1098 1171 1792
Sweden 54 60 61 128 148 203
United Kingdom 702 924 1267 805 596 548
Source: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports> 
It is worth noting in passing that regional aid spending varies very widely between 
countries. Direct comparisons are not straightforward, but some indicators are provided in 
Figure 5, based on averages for the period 2002-07. These figures suggest that regional aid 
spending, as a proportion of total aid spending, varies in importance between countries. 
For example, in some countries regional aid accounts for more than a third of all State aid 
expenditure (Greece, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Luxembourg), while in others it accounts 
for less than 10 percent (Romania, Austria, Sweden, Cyprus, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Denmark).  
In absolute terms, regional aid spending ranges from over €1 billion a year on average 
(Germany, Italy, France, Spain) to less than €20 million (Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia). Clearly, however, this is at least partly a function of country size and 
these differences narrow when expenditure is considered as a proportion of GDP. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that many of the least-prosperous Member States spend 
much more in relation to the size of their economies than do richer Member States. For 
example, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania and Greece (along with Spain 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 73  European Policies Research Centre 14
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
and Germany) all spent over 0.1 percent of GDP on regional aid in 2002-07, while Finland, 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark (along with Estonia and Portugal) all spent 
less than 0.04 percent of GDP.  
Figure 5 also indicates expenditure per head in the recipient regions, which, in principle, 
might be regarded as the most accurate measure of the intensity of regional aid spending. 
This suggests that while some (more prosperous) countries spend in excess of €50 per head 
of assisted area population (Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium and Italy) 
other (predominantly poorer) countries spend less than €10 per head (Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal, Denmark, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia). 
Figure 5: Regional aid spending indicators (average 2002-2007) 
 % of total aid to 
industry and 
services 
Annual average 
spending - €m 
% of GDP € per head of 
assisted area 
population 
EU27 18.5 9757 0.0849 37.1 
EU15 18.8 8790 0.0816 55.2 
NMS12 19.5 967 0.1343 9.4 
Austria 8.7 82 0.0326 36.5 
Belgium 23.0 207 0.0676 64.8 
Denmark 0.4 5 0.0021 5.0 
Finland 10.7 60 0.0370 28.0 
France 19.3 1359 0.0757 76.6 
Germany 17.6 2943 0.1275 104.6 
Greece 79.9 333 0.1603 30.0 
Ireland 21.8 116 0.0709 32.3 
Italy 25.7 1376 0.0931 55.7 
Luxembourg 33.7 20 0.0645 146.2 
Netherlands 5.0 58 0.0112 28.2 
Portugal 3.7 57 0.0360 5.9 
Spain 29.7 1213 0.1255 38.2 
Sweden 6.0 109 0.0346 76.7 
United Kingdom 20.5 807 0.0424 45.2 
Cyprus 5.3 9 0.0627 12.7 
Czech Republic 29.9 185 0.1722 18.7 
Estonia 24.9 3 0.0253 2.2 
Hungary 25.9 233 0.2502 23.0 
Latvia 66.5 18 0.1056 7.7 
Lithuania 28.1 13 0.0540 3.7 
Malta ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Poland 17.2 246 0.0967 6.5 
Slovakia 58.7 121 0.3052 22.9 
Slovenia 18.7 26 0.0843 12.8 
Bulgaria 45.5 22 0.0886 2.8 
Romania 8.8 92 0.1003 4.3 
Source: Own calculations from European Commission Scoreboard, Eurostat data and assisted area 
coverage data. 
In practice, such calculations should be treated with caution, and this for two main 
reasons. First, not all aid schemes for a given country apply in all designated areas. In 
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France, for example, the figures probably include expenditure on the DOM,28 which is 
relatively high, but covers a very small proportion of the overall population, and is also 
skewed by spending exclusively targeted on Corsica; as a result, expenditure per head in 
mainland France is likely to be much lower than the figure given here, while that in the 
DOMs and Corsica would be very much higher. The position would be similar in Germany, 
where the investment allowance is available only in the new Länder, while the investment 
grant is available in all assisted areas. Second, the data concern payments related to 
earlier commitments. These commitments may have been made to projects in areas which 
were within the map prior to 2000, but ceased to be so for the period 2000-07. 
In the absence of more detailed data on the schemes to which the data relate, it is not 
possible to reach robust conclusions about regional aid spending. However, the data as 
presented support the Commission’s view that regional aid award rates should be lowered 
across the board because poorer countries lack the budgetary capacity to compete with 
richer ones and reinforce the Commission’s perception of its success in constraining 
regional aid in the richer Member States, since trend data indicates falling regional aid 
spending in the EU15 and rising expenditure in the new Member States (see Figure 4). 
3.2 Some national perspectives on regional aid in the crisis 
Regional aid responses to the economic crisis have varied, although it is true to say that in 
general the regional policy response has not been a high profile component of government 
actions. In broad terms, two main approaches can be identified among the partner 
countries: an active response where regional aid instruments are marshalled alongside 
other measures; and a broadly neutral response where regional aid policy is largely 
unaffected. 
France and Germany have taken what can be termed an ‘active’ regional aid response to 
the crisis – although in reality the measures involved are minor components of the overall 
package.  
In Germany, the federal government’s first fiscal stimulus package of November 2008 
allocated additional funding of €200 million to the Regional GA (the joint Land-federal task 
for regional policy); the annual budget is typically around €600 million, of which 6/7th are 
earmarked for the new Länder. Half of the funding can be spent in 2009, with remainder to 
be committed in 2010 and 2011. As in the case of core GA funding, individual Länder must 
provide match-funding in order to draw down the federal contribution. However, unlike 
core GA funding, these new resources are divided equally between the old and the new 
Länder, although obviously funds can still only be expended in designated development 
areas. Each Land is free to decide whether to use the additional GA funding for direct aid 
to businesses, business-oriented infrastructure or soft measures.  
In addition, the GA has taken advantage of the increased flexibility under the Commission’s 
temporary framework to raise the level of small-scale aid to €500,000, from the standard 
                                                 
28 Although the Commission data do not enable this to be confirmed.  
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de minimis level of €200,000. This change applies to designated C and D areas which are 
not eligible under Article 87(3)(c), but which the German authorities designate for domestic 
purposes and in which de minimis aid is available. The investment allowance, which has a 
budget of around €2.3 billion over 2010-13 and is restricted to the new Länder is not 
affected by these changes. However, the scheme is being progressively phased out over this 
period. 
In France the approach has been slightly different, although there are some common 
elements. There is no additional funding for the main regional incentive grant, the prime 
d’aménagement du territoire (PAT), for which the annual budget is rather modest at 
around €40 million; however, some eligibility criteria have been relaxed in recognition of 
the additional constraints facing firms as a consequence of the crisis. In particular, the 
minimum eligible investment for extension projects was reduced from €25 million to €10 
million; for takeover projects the minimum number of jobs safeguarded was lowered from 
150 to 80 and the minimum investment from €15 million to €5 million. 
In addition to the PAT, and far more significant in overall budgetary terms, France operates 
a large number of spatially-discriminating fiscal incentives The precise total involved in 
these schemes is difficult to quantify, but has been estimated at over €910 million 
annually;29 moreover, it is unclear whether this includes only the cost to central 
government or also the cost to local authorities where the concessions are not reimbursed 
by the State. Nevertheless, it is clear that overall expenditure on such measures dwarfs 
that under the PAT. Many of these schemes have been operated on the basis of the de 
minimis Regulation and have therefore generally been limited to €200,000 over three years. 
The measures target a number of spatially-restricted objectives, including support for 
urban development, rural development, redevelopment of defence closure areas, priority 
employment zones, standard PAT areas, competitiveness poles, etc. Each of these 
comprises a mix of instruments including tax credits, reductions and exemptions in relation 
to a number of taxes, including those levied nationally, such as corporation tax and some 
social security contributions, but also several that are levied at the subnational level, 
notably the taxe professionnelle and local property taxes. As in Germany, the French 
authorities have used the temporary framework effectively to increase the de minimis aid 
level until end 2010. The budgetary implications of this are unclear. Informally, the cost of 
the measures under the ‘new de minimis’ limit was estimated at around €1.5 billion, but 
this includes many schemes with nationwide application and not just those that target 
problem regions.  
One last point to note in the context of French regional aid concerns the assisted area map. 
The French authorities had sought the extension of eligibility for the temporary aid areas 
which expired at the end of 2008, and justified this on the basis of the impact of the 
financial crisis; however, this was turned down by the Commission. On the other hand, the 
French authorities have made a second use of the population reserve to extend the assisted 
                                                 
29 Sénat (2009) Rapport Général fait au nom de la commission des Finances, du contrôle budgétaire et 
des comptes économiques de la nation sur le projet de loi des finances pour 2009, Tome III, Annexe 
No. 19.  
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areas map; this reserve had been kept at the time of the initial designation process in order 
to respond flexibly to economic changes as they arose, but each change obviously requires 
Commission approval. The initial reserve comprised a population of around 250,000; this 
second extension of the map uses up the remainder of that quota. Ten additional areas 
have been added to the map; nine of these as a consequence of the impact of defence 
restructuring.  
In Italy there have been some indirect changes insofar as the domestic strand of regional 
policy funded through the Fondo Aree Sottoutilizzate (FAS – fund for the underdeveloped 
areas) has been cut in order to provide resources for the (nationwide) crisis measures. Only 
some of this funding involves regional incentives, and there appears to be some doubt in 
Italy about the capacity to implement crisis aid measures within the schedule of the 
Temporary Framework. Nevertheless, in principle, such moves could be seen as an erosion 
of regional policy measures.  
In the United Kingdom, the SME components of the main regional incentives – Grant for 
Business Investment (GBI) in England and Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in Scotland 
have been extended. Until now, as well as the designated ‘a’ regions and ‘c’ areas, so-
called Tier 3 areas have been chosen on the basis of domestic criteria; within these areas 
assistance has been available to small firms at the rate of 10 percent of eligible investment 
and medium-sized firms at the rate of 7.5 percent. In response to the crisis, Tier 3 has, in 
effect, been extended to all regions not covered by ‘a’ region or ‘c’ area status and the 
rates of award in these areas raised to 20 percent and 10 percent for small and medium-
sized firms respectively. In practice this move essentially just takes full advantage of the 
possibilities provided for SME aid under the General Block Exemption Regulation.  
In most EoRPA partner countries – Austria, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and 
Sweden – there have been no changes to regional aid policies as a consequence of the crisis. 
In general the rationale for this is that it is not considered to be the role of regional policy 
to act as a ‘fire-fighter’ in times of crisis and that regional policy should have a longer-term 
strategic approach.  
Notwithstanding the more proactive elements in German and French regional aid policy 
with respect to the crisis, it is evident that regional policy per se has so far had only a small 
role in response to the recession. In many respects this is scarcely surprising. In part owing 
to EU competition policy constraints, regional aid policies are designed to encourage new 
investment and the value of aid is tied to that investment and/or job creation. In the 
current period, new investment has been scarce; indeed many regional aid administrators 
report a significant downturn in regional aid applications and, even where regional aid 
measures have been enhanced or relaxed in response to the crisis, the uptake appears to 
have been limited. By contrast, the measures available under the Temporary Framework 
are more likely to appear attractive in the current climate. This is perhaps particularly true 
of the ‘temporary de minimis’ aid which can take the form of grants or tax relief untied to 
any specific expenditure. Although there might be concerns that the nationwide availability 
of such measures threatens to undermine the advantage that regional aid confers on the 
problem regions, such views do not take account of the spatial distribution of the crisis 
measures. In practice, little is currently known about this – or about the implementation of 
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the crisis measures more generally – nevertheless, it can be said that in many instances 
firms within the problem regions will benefit from the crisis measures. For example, the 
motor industry has received high levels of assistance in several countries and is often 
heavily concentrated in the designated areas.  
4. REGIONAL AID TO LARGE INVESTMENT PROJECTS 
The control of regional aid to large investment projects within approved schemes has long 
been a preoccupation of the Commission. However, it is only within the last decade or so 
that the Commission has introduced the means to achieve this. The first such mechanism 
was introduced in the late 1990s in the form of the so-called 1998 Multisectoral 
Framework.30 This provided that aid exceeding specified ceilings had to be notified 
individually and assessed by the Commission against a set of predetermined criteria. In 
practice, the 1998 Multisectoral Framework failed to have any real impact on award values, 
largely owing to the design of the assessment criteria. It was replaced by the 2002 
Multisectoral Framework (MSF 2002),31 which in turn was incorporated into the 2007-13 
Regional Aid Guidelines,32 albeit with some changes. 
Since MSF 2002, there have been two main strands to Commission action on aid to large 
projects. First, the systematic lowering of aid maxima for all projects involving eligible 
investments exceeding €50 million and the reporting of all aid to such projects (whatever 
the amount of aid). Second, the prior notification and approval of very large awards and 
their assessment against the terms of RAG 2006 by the Commission; individual notification 
is required where the aid proposed is higher than that which a project involving eligible 
investment of €100 million could have obtained on the basis of the application of the 
formula. Such cases may lead to the opening of the investigative procedure before aid can 
be approved. Indeed, where notified cases raise issues related to market share or capacity, 
the Commission must explicitly set competition considerations against the regional 
development benefits that the project might bring. In 2009, somewhat belatedly, the 
Commission published its Guidance on the criteria it would use in this assessment. 
The discussion that follows is in three parts: the first provides an outline of the regulatory 
framework for regional aid to large projects; the second considers the Guidance for in-
depth project assessment; and the third provides a brief overview of reported and notified 
aid since MSF 2002. 
                                                 
30 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJEC No C 107 of 7 April 
1998. 
31 Multisectoral Framework on regional aid to large investment projects – Rescue and restructuring aid 
and closure aid for the steel sector, OJEC No C 70/8 of 19 March 2002. 
32 RAG 2006, Section 4.3. 
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4.1 The regulatory framework for regional aid to large projects 
4.1.1 Award values 
The essence of the provisions on large investment projects is to reduce rates of award 
under existing regional aid schemes to projects with eligible investment of more than 
€50 million. This is achieved through a reduction scale (the larger the project, the lower 
the rate of award) incorporated into the regional aid schemes operated by the Member 
States, as set out in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Rate reduction matrix for large investments 
Eligible expenditure Aid ceiling 
Up to € 50 million 100 % of regional aid ceiling 
For the part between € 50 and € 100 million 50 % of regional aid ceiling 
For the part exceeding € 100 million 34 % of regional aid ceiling 
 
As Figure 6 shows, projects involving investments of less than € 50 million are unaffected by 
the matrix. However, for large projects the standard award rate is progressively reduced. 
This is illustrated in the Regional Aid Guidelines as follows:33 
Maximum rate of award = R * (50 + 0.5B + 0.34C) 
Where R is the unadjusted regional aid ceiling; B is the eligible expenditure between € 50 
million and € 100 million; and C is any expenditure above € 100 million 
The impact of this formula on the standard award maxima under the 2007-13 Regional Aid 
Guidelines is shown in Figure 7.34 As would be expected, the higher the amount of eligible 
investment, the lower the rate of award applicable since an increasing proportion of the 
investment qualifies for aid at only 34 per cent of the prevailing regional aid rate. Thus, for 
an investment of € 500 million, the maximum rate of award in a 10 percent rate ‘c’ area 
would be 4.22 percent of eligible investment – a maximum of € 21.1 million. 
Figure 7: Impact of the large investment project provisions on award rates 
Standard ceilings (% GGE)  
10 15 20 30 40 50 
Eligible  
expenditure Adjusted ceilings (% GGE) 
€ 50 m 10.00 15.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 
€ 100 m 7.50 11.25 15.00 22.50 30.00 37.50 
€ 150 m 6.13 9.20 12.27 18.40 24.53 30.67 
€ 200 m 5.45 8.18 10.90 16.35 21.80 27.25 
€ 300 m 4.77 7.15 9.53 14.30 19.07 23.83 
€ 500 m 4.22 6.33 8.44 12.66 16.88 21.10 
 
                                                 
33 2007-13 Regional Aid Guidelines, para 67. 
34 In MSF 2002 there was a significant exception to this principle: the reduction matrix did not apply 
to the motor vehicle industry where, instead, the aid ceiling was set at 30 percent of the prevailing 
rate for all projects with investment exceeding € 50 million or an aid amount exceeding € 5 million. 
This provision is important in the later discussion of individual aid cases. 
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4.1.2 Notifiable projects 
Importantly, however, individual notification is required where the aid proposed is higher 
than that which a project involving eligible investment of € 100 million could have obtained 
on the basis of the application of the formula. As Figure 8 shows, for very large projects the 
notification thresholds bite at very low levels of aid when expressed as a percentage of 
investment. In a 10 percent rate area, the notification threshold in proposed aid would be 
€ 7.5 million, just 1.5 percent of a € 500 million investment. 
Figure 8: Individual notification ceilings for large investment projects 
 Standard ceilings (% GGE) 
 10 15 20 30 40 50 
 Aid notification threshold (€ million) 
 7.5 11.25 15.0 22.5 30.0 37.5 
Eligible expenditure Notification threshold (% of eligible expenditure) 
€ 50 m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
€ 100 m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
€ 150 m 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 
€ 200 m 3.75 5.63 7.5 11.25 15.0 18.75 
€ 300 m 2.5 3.75 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 
€ 500 m 1.5 2.25 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 
 
For individually notifiable projects where either: 
a) the aid beneficiary accounts for more than 25 per cent of the sales of the products 
concerned on the markets concerned (either before or after the investment); or 
b) the capacity created by the project is more than 5 per cent of the size of the 
market measured in apparent consumption, except in rapidly growing markets; 
the Commission will only approve regional aid after opening the Article 88(2) investigative 
procedure and a “detailed verification… that the aid is necessary to provide an incentive 
effect for the investment and that the benefits of the aid outweigh the resulting distortion 
of competition and effect on trade”.35 In the course of 2009, the Commission produced its 
guidance on the criteria to be used for making this assessment; this is discussed in the 
section that follows.  
4.2 In-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects 
The publication of the Guidance on the in-depth assessment of regional aid to large 
investment projects was long-awaited;36 the Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-
13 provided that the Commission would issue its criteria before the entry into force of the 
Guidelines, ie. 31 December 2006. It was not until November 2008 that the Commission put 
out a draft to consultation (for comments by February 2009), with the final version adopted 
in June 2009; there was little substantive change between drafts. The delay in producing 
                                                 
35 2007-13 Regional Aid Guidelines 
36 Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional 
aid to large investment projects, OJEU C223/2 of 16 September 2009.  
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this Communication perhaps reflects the considerable challenge involved in verifying that 
“aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect for the investment and that the benefits of 
the aid measure outweigh the resulting distortion of competition”. 
In practice, the number of cases in which the guidance will be applied will be very few. A 
small number of proposed awards exceed the notification threshold annually; of these the 
great majority raise no market share or capacity issues so the application of the Guidance is 
likely to be rare. Nevertheless, it is an important contribution to Commission’s 
interpretation of the ‘more economic approach’ to State aid control proposed in the State 
Aid Action Plan. 
The starting premise for the guidance is that graduated aid intensities are the simplest and 
most direct way for the Commission to balance the positive effect which regional 
investment aid can have in promoting cohesion through the attraction of investment to 
eligible areas against the negative effects inherent in aid to individual undertakings. 
However, since large investments are less affected by important region-specific problems in 
disadvantaged areas, there is an increased risk of impact on trade and of a distortion effect 
in relation to other competitors. Also, the Commission perceives there to be a risk that the 
aid is more than the minimum necessary to compensate for regional disadvantages and that 
State aid to such projects leads to perverse effects such as inefficient location choices, 
higher distortion of competition and, since aid involves a transfer from tax payers, net 
welfare losses. Moreover, for very large projects (those proposed to receive a higher 
amount of aid than a €100 million project would be awarded), these risks are considered to 
be more acute. For this reason, under MSF 2002 where these very large projects exceeded 
the market share or capacity thresholds set out in the Guidelines, the Commission did not 
authorise additional aid beyond that calculated under the award formula; indeed, MSF 2002 
did not afford the Commission the discretion to do this. Under the 2007-13 Regional Aid 
Guidelines, a more ‘individualised’ approach is taken, setting the cohesion and other 
benefits against the trade and competition impacts “in as concrete a fashion as possible.”  
Given this context, the Guidance aims to “ensure the transparency and predictability of the 
Commission decision making process, and equal treatment of Member States.” The 
Guidance deals first with the positive effects of aid, including a consideration of the 
objectives of aid, the appropriateness of the aid instrument, the incentive effect and 
proportionality. It goes on to consider the negative effects, including the crowding-out of 
private investment and the effects on trade. Last it refers to balancing the effects of aid.  
4.2.1 Positive effects 
Regarding the positive effects, the objectives of aid (equity and possibly efficiency) are 
given an extensive treatment. There is a list of indicative criteria which may be used to 
demonstrate the regional contribution of the aid insofar as it may attract additional 
investment and activity to the region. The list is non-exhaustive, but includes: 
 the number of direct jobs created, as well as their quality and the skills level; 
 indirect job creation, for example in the (sub)supplier network; 
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 the commitment of the beneficiary to general and specific workforce training; 
 external economies of scale or other benefits arising from a clustering effect; 
 the technological intensity of the activity and the scope for knowledge spillovers; 
 the contribution of the project to the region’s ability to create new technology 
through local innovation – eg through cooperation with higher education; 
 the duration of the investment and scope for possible follow on investment.  
Member States are encouraged to rely on past evaluations of State aid measures, impact 
assessments and other studies, as well as the business plan of the beneficiary (for instance, 
regarding job creation, salaries paid and other direct and indirect effects). 
Where relevant, the Commission will also consider the relationship between the planned 
investment, the National Strategic Reference Framework and the Operational Programme 
co-financed by the Structural Funds. In particular, it may take account of any Commission 
decision on the measure in the context of so-called ‘major projects’ under the Structural 
Funds which, among other things, is based on a cost-benefit analysis, including a risk 
assessment and the foreseeable sectoral and socio-economic impacts. 
The appropriateness of the aid instrument is also mentioned, but it is not clear what the 
practical outcome of this consideration is; could the outcome be that the Commission 
deems other measures to be more appropriate in a given case?  
Analysis of the incentive effect of the aid measure “is regarded as one of the most 
important elements” of the analysis. The Guidance notes that this is assessed at two levels. 
The first, essentially procedural, concerns the timing of the application in relation to the 
project start, with the presumption being that aid is not necessary if the project starts 
before a decision on the application is made. The second element is more complex and 
involves a verification “that the aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect for the 
investment”. The aim of this analysis is to determine whether or not the incentive alters 
the investment behaviour of the firm such that it undertakes additional investment in the 
assisted region – in part reflecting the fact that there may be valid reasons for a firm to 
locate in a given area without any aid being granted. In practice, this closely mirrors 
attempts by some national governments to improve ‘value-for-money’ and reduce windfall 
gains in incentive administration. In the UK, for example, the additionality criterion has 
traditionally been an important component in the analysis, with investors being required to 
show that, in the absence of aid, the project would not go ahead on the proposed scale, 
timeframe or in an assisted area location. Subsequent evaluations have, however, 
suggested that 20 percent of projects (as a proportion of aid paid) would have gone ahead 
on the same basis without the aid.37 This outcome is testament to the difficulty in making 
realistic assessments in the face of information asymmetries.  
                                                 
37 Arup Economics and Planning (2000) Evaluation of Regional Selective Assistance 1991-95, Final 
Report for DTI, National Assembly for Wales, Scottish Executive. 
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The Guidance envisages that an incentive effect can be proven in two possible scenarios: 
1. The aid gives an incentive to change the investment decision because an investment 
that would otherwise not be profitable for the company at any location can take place 
in the assisted region. 
2. The aid gives an incentive to change the location decision because it compensates for 
the net handicaps and costs linked to a location in the assisted region. 
The circumstances in which Scenario 1 might arise are not explained. It may be surmised 
that the number of cases involving a project which raises market power or capacity issues, 
but which is not profitable in any location, would be few; in what circumstances would an 
investor contemplate such a project? Is the presumption that the project would never be 
profitable and might it therefore require long-term state aid to sustain it? It is perhaps also 
questionable what such a project would ultimately contribute to regional development. 
Regarding Scenario 2, two main points are worth making. First, an assisted area location 
may not be more costly. Of course, in theory, this should mean that the investor would be 
drawn to the lower cost location anyway. In practice, such decisions may be affected by 
bounded rationality, the perceived (but unquantifiable) risks associated with a first 
investment in a given location or other qualitative criteria. In this context, financial 
incentives may be required to offset such perceptions. Second, the approach largely mirrors 
that taken under the now-defunct Frameworks on State aid to the motor vehicle sector, 
which used an analysis of comparator locations in order to illustrate the net costs and 
handicaps. In practice, the application of this criterion relies very heavily on information 
provided by the investor; it has been noted that under the motor vehicle frameworks, on 
some occasions, firms were willing to accept less in aid than the apparent cost handicap, 
suggesting that either non-cost factors were responsible or that the firm was withholding 
quantifiable information.38 Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that it is simply a 
question of selecting the ‘right’ comparator to obtain the desired result. In short, while the 
premise of this criterion seems rational, its practical application may be undermined by 
information asymmetry and it may fail to take adequate account of non-cost factors. 
The Guidance stresses that aid must be proportionate – the amount and intensity should be 
limited to the minimum necessary for the investment to take place in the assisted region.  
In Scenario 1 aid will be considered proportionate if, because of the aid, the return on 
investment is in line with the normal rate of return applied by the company, the cost of 
capital for the company as a whole or returns commonly observed in the industry. In the 
absence of any explanation of what project might be contemplated under this scenario, it is 
difficult to envisage the circumstances in which it would be justifiable to authorise aid to a 
project which raises capacity or market power concerns but has no prospects for 
profitability.  
                                                 
38 "The Sources and Processes of Tax and Subsidy Competition" by Kenneth P. Thomas, Comments by 
Rod Meiklejohn at: http://www.hhh.umn.edu/projects/prie/pdf/meiklejohn_comments.pdf 
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In Scenario 2 aid will generally be considered proportionate if it equals the difference 
between the net costs in an assisted area location and those in the alternative regions. The 
relevance of this sum and the difficulties involved in calculating it have been alluded to 
already. A further question is whether the alternative location(s) could also have assisted 
area status? 
4.2.2 Negative effects 
For projects undergoing this detailed analysis, there is a presumption of concern either in 
relation to the creation of excessive market power and/or potential overcapacity in a 
market in structural decline which maintain inefficient market structures. Understandably, 
these elements are to be given particular emphasis in Scenario 1 cases – those where the 
investment would not take place anywhere without the aid. The corollary is that, if the 
investment would have gone ahead anyway, albeit in another location (Scenario 2), and if 
the aid is proportional, then the impact on competition such as higher market share or 
capacity increase in an underperforming market would be the same regardless of aid. The 
Guidance also considers that aid could have a negative effect on trade.  
The rationale for limiting aid to firms with market power is that aid to one beneficiary in a 
concentrated market is more likely to distort competition because investment decisions in 
oligopolistic markets affect competitors more directly; this is considered all the more so if 
the dominant player is subsidised. In the initial analysis, the assessment is based on the 
share of the beneficiary in the relevant product and geographic markets. However, this is 
considered to give only a preliminary indication of possible problems and, in an in-depth 
assessment, the Commission proposes to take account of other factors. These could 
include: 
 market structure – where, for example, there a few market players, but all have a 
relatively high share of the market, the high market share of the beneficiary might 
be of less concern; 
 barriers to entry – including economies of scale and scope, legal barriers (such as 
intellectual property rights), access barriers to networks and infrastructure; 
 ‘buyer power’ – where there are strong buyers, the beneficiary is less likely to be 
able to increase prices; and 
 barriers to exit – where there are significant costs attached to leaving a given 
market – such as writing off capital investment or redundancy; these costs may be 
higher than remaining within the market. 
The assessment will take account of these and market share related factors both before 
and after the investment – normally the year before the investment starts and the year 
after full production is reached. A key problem in applying the criteria related to the 
market analysis seems likely to be that of credible data, for a sufficient time period and at 
the requisite level of product detail. 
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Regarding market structures, the Guidance states that it is a sign of efficient competition 
if inefficient firms are forced to exit a market. However, an increase in capacity in a 
market already in overcapacity could lead to competitors, who would otherwise remain, 
being forced out of the market. It may also inhibit low-cost entrants and weaken incentives 
to innovate; ultimately, inefficient market structures may harm consumers. 
The Guidance distinguishes between markets that are in absolute and relative decline. 
Absolute decline – ie. a negative growth rate – is considered unlikely by the Commission to 
be compensated for by any positive elements. Relative decline is defined as showing a 
positive growth rate, but below that of EEA GDP growth over the last five years before 
project start – the so-called benchmark rate. The Commission may also take into account 
expected future trends in the growth of the market, capacity utilisation rates and the 
impact of the capacity increase on competitors through its effects on prices and profit 
margins. In the in-depth analysis the Commission will also consider whether the EEA is the 
appropriate benchmark to assess the effects of the aid. 
The Guidance also refers to the impact on trade. It argues that when regional aid is off-
setting the additional costs stemming from regional handicaps and supports additional 
investment in the assisted areas, it contributes not only to the development of the region, 
but also ultimately to cohesion in the EU as a whole. The negative effects of regional aid 
are perceived to be recognised in and to some extent limited by the regional aid guidelines. 
However, in one of the few changes to the initial draft, the Guidance requires the 
Commission to have “all necessary information to consider whether State aid would result 
in a substantial loss of jobs in existing locations within the European Union.” The Guidance 
adds that, where production capacity is added in a declining market, the negative effects 
on trade may be felt through the loss of economic activity in other regions. It seems certain 
that this provision was added to the Guidance as a consequence of concerns in several 
Member States about job relocation; however, it is unclear how the Commission assessment 
would handle this information. 
4.2.3 Balancing the effects of the aid 
This final section of the Guidance is short and gives no real insight into how the most 
important element of the analysis – the ‘balancing’ of the positive and negative effects – 
will be carried out in practice. Indeed, its terms seem to reinforce the scope for 
Commission discretion rather than “ensure the transparency and predictability of the 
Commission decision making process”. The Guidance states that careful consideration will 
be given to the overall effects of aid on cohesion but that the Commission “will not use the 
criteria set out in this guidance mechanically but will make an overall assessment of their 
relative importance. No single element is determinant, nor can any set of elements be 
regarded as sufficient on its own to ensure compatibility”. 
Two points do, however, emerge. The first is that, in Scenario 2 where proof has to be 
given of an alternative location, if, without aid, the project would have located to a poorer 
region (higher aid intensity) or to a region with the same disadvantage (same aid intensity), 
then this will constitute a negative element in the balancing test that is unlikely to be 
compensated for. Conversely, where aid “merely compensates for the differences in net 
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costs” relative to a more developed location, the positive effect will normally be 
considered to outweigh the negative effect. To some extent, this is stating the obvious: the 
overall objective of regional aid is to influence location decisions in favour of problem 
regions and a potential aid beneficiary would clearly be ill-advised, for the purposes of this 
analysis, to select an even more disadvantaged region as its location of choice in the 
absence of aid. Similarly, the ‘ideal’ situation is where aid simply compensates for the 
additional costs of a problem region location. There are, however, considerable difficulties 
involved in establishing this sum; moreover, the informational assymetries involved seem 
likely to favour the beneficiary. A further point to note is that the Guidance makes no 
explicit mention of the possibility of a non-EU location; it is not clear whether this is 
implicit in the consideration of comparator locations. 
The second point is that, where there is credible evidence that State aid would result in a 
substantial loss of jobs elsewhere in the EU, and which would otherwise have been 
preserved in the medium-term, the economic and social effects on the existing location 
must be taken into account in the balancing exercise; the Guidance does not specify how.  
The overall outcome of the Guidance is that, while there is a relatively clear indication of 
the (abundant) documentation that will be sought from aid authorities and applicants, 
there is scant detail on how that information will be interpreted in practice. 
A more fundamental issue is the impact of the Guidance itself on the incentive effect of 
regional aid. The Guidance here comes into play after a project has been notified and has 
undergone a preliminary analysis that has concluded that that there may be market power 
or capacity concerns. The application process which preceded the notification may itself 
have been lengthy; the prospect of an investigative procedure adds to the delay. There is 
an inherent conflict in the requirement that aid be needed (incentive effect) and the 
uncertainty created by the investigative procedure. It can be argued that the incentives 
most likely to alter business behaviour are those that are predictable and can be factored 
into business decisions at the outset. The length and complexity of the notification and 
investigative procedure create considerable uncertainty and delays for applicants. This may 
lead to aid being discounted in the investment decision and treated as a bonus should aid 
ultimately be approved. In other words, the bureaucratic process may itself result in higher 
windfall gains – ie. less incentive effect – because applicants are able to exploit information 
asymmetry to meet the requirements of the Guidance. 
4.3 Reported and notified aids to large investment projects 
An important element of recent State aid reforms is the emphasis on transparency. Since 
MSF 2002, two new sources of information on large projects have emerged.39 First, the 
                                                 
39 MSF 1998 also required notification and priori approval of measures above certain aid and 
investment levels and this experience informed the changes introduced under MSF 2002. 
However, there was no general reporting requirement for assistance to large projects and 
no published information. 
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Commission has required ex-post reporting of aid to projects exceeding €50 million. 
Second, as described above, Member States must notify to the Commission cases where the 
aid proposed is higher than that which a project involving eligible investment of €100 
million could have obtained on the basis of the application of the formula; aid above this 
limit must have the prior approval of the Commission. The sections which follow consider 
the output from the general reporting requirement and the notification requirement in 
turn. 
4.3.1 Reported large aid cases 
Under the reporting requirement, some 200 award cases have been reported in the period 
2003-09. These are summarised in Figure 9, which shows that Germany, Spain and Hungary 
together account for more than half of all large aided projects reported and that a 
significant number of countries have not reported any instances of aid to large projects. 
Meanwhile, three countries (Austria, Romania and Sweden) have only reported one case in 
the whole period. 
Figure 9: Reported aids to investments exceeding €50 million – number of cases to date 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Austria   1     1 
Belgium  1  4  3  8 
Czech Rep  1   10 1  12 
Germany  2 6 9 12 14  43 
Greece      4  4 
Spain  4  8 20 3  35 
France   1 3 1   5 
Hungary  1 6 11 6 7 1 32 
Ireland    5 8 3  16 
Italy  3  3    6 
Netherlands    1    1 
Poland   1 3 3 1  8 
Portugal  1   14   15 
Romania      1  1 
Sweden   1     1 
UK 1 1 4 2 1 3 1 13 
Total 1 14 20 49 75 40 2 201 
Source: Collated from data in the transparency system on regional aid, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ 
Partly reflecting the number of cases, the amounts of aid involved also vary between 
countries (see Figure 10). It is difficult to draw conclusions from this data since the number 
of cases varies widely from year to year. Nevertheless, it can be seen that, for example, 
Germany and Hungary, and to a lesser extent Spain and the Czech Republic, are 
consistently high spenders on large projects, while the UK spends relatively small amounts. 
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Figure 10: Reported aid amounts to large projects (excluding notified projects) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 0.0 0.0 14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.0 18.0 0.0 31.5 0.0 38.0 0.0 
Czech Rep 0.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 313.2 22.1 0.0 
Germany 0.0 42.3 156.3 184.4 226.7 214.2 0.0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 146.0 0.0 
Spain 0.0 130.5 0.0 165.5 222.8 24.6 0.0 
France 0.0 0.0 18.4 16.9 11.3 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 0.0 11.2 107.1 226.4 171.0 132.0 19.2 
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.2 72.0 13.3 0.0 
Italy 0.0 88.9 0.0 78.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 0.0 0.0 9.5 23.6 20.8 25.3 0.0 
Portugal 0.0 69.4 0.0 0.0 278.6 0.0 0.0 
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.4 0.0 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
UK 2.9 7.3 36.1 27.7 10.1 30.8 10.1 
Total 2.9 399.0 346.4 800.6 1326.4 671.7 29.3 
Note: These figures should be treated with some caution since they are current nominal 
values and the dates refer to the year of reporting, not necessarily the year of award. 
Source: Collated from data in the transparency system on regional aid, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ 
4.3.2 Notifiable large aid cases 
As mentioned above, projects involving aid beyond that for which a €100 million project 
could qualify have to be notified individually and approved prior to being aided. In 
practice, few cases have been notified to the Commission on the basis of these provisions, 
and very few have been subject to formal investigation. By August 2009, a total of 41 cases 
had been notified under either the 2002 Multisectoral Framework or the 2007-13 Regional 
Aid Guidelines (see Figure 11); of these, one (Intel) was withdrawn when it seemed likely 
that the Commission would open the investigative procedure and find against the aid 
proposed. The Commission has opened the investigative procedure in five cases.  
In Ibiden the Commission reached the only negative decision to date.40 The case concerned 
the definition of the relevant market for diesel engine exhaust systems and the share of the 
recipient in that market. The Commission concluded that the relevant market was the 
diesel particulate filter (DPF) market and that the share of IBIDEN in the European DPF 
market substantially exceeded the 25 percent threshold both before and after the 
investment; it therefore prohibited aid (some €9.56 million) above the notification 
threshold, although the initial €29.73 million was unaffected by this decision. An important 
point to note here is that this case was decided under MSF 2002; this did not provide the 
Commission with any discretion in the event that competition concerns arose. Under the 
2007-13 Regional Aid Guidelines, the Commission would have had the discretion to 
authorise the aid, if it considered it appropriate, based on the guidance for the in-depth 
assessment of aid to large projects discussed above. 
                                                 
40 Commission Decision of 30 April 2008 on State aid C 21/07 (ex N 578/06) which Hungary is planning 
to implement in favour of IBIDEN Hungary Gyártó Kft., OJEU No. L 295/34 of 4 November 2008.  
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In Sovello41 and BVG42 the Commission reached positive decisions. In Sovello, the decision 
largely turned on whether a previous aided investment constituted part of the same 
project, in which case the aid ceiling would have been lower. Following the investigation, 
the Commission concluded that the projects were separate and that the positive impact on 
regional development outweighed the potential distortions of competition. In BVG the 
Commission examined whether the production capacity created by the project remained 
below the 5 percent threshold; it concluded that it did so and the aid was approved. 
In Dell, the Commission investigated proposed aid for a computer manufacturing plant in 
Lodz, Poland.43 The case turned on a number of elements, including the definition of the 
relevant product market (are desktops and laptops part of the same market? How to 
segment the server market?), the relevant geographical market and the calculation of 
market capacity for the purposes of paragraph 68(b) of the Guidelines – see above. The 
Commission reached a positive decision on the aid in September 2009,44 noting that this 
case involved the first application of its Guidance on aid to large projects (discussed 
above). Details of the decision have not yet been published. 
An investigation is also underway into proposed aid to Deutsche Solar for a solar wafer 
production facility in Sachsen.45 Deutsche Solar already has two plants – Freiburg South and 
Freiburg Saxonia - and intends to create a third in Freiburg East. A proposed extension at 
Freiburg South is also being aided, but the investment involved is less than €50 million, so 
that the German authorities did not consider that notification was required. However, given 
the timing of the two investments, the Commission has opened the investigative procedure 
to assess the links between the two investments and establish whether they should in fact 
be considered as a single project, in which case a lower aid amount would apply.  
One feature of recent notifications to which it is worth drawing attention is that they now 
include the motor vehicle sector. Indeed, these are among the bigger cases – see Ford (two 
cases), Mercedes and Fiat. Under MSF 2002, cases in this sector did not require individual 
notification, instead a flat reduction rate was applied; under the 2007-13 Regional Aid 
Guidelines, the same rules apply to all sectors. 
                                                 
41 Decision not yet published in the OJ, but see Commission decision in C21/2008 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1 
42 Decision not yet published in the OJ, but see RAPID Press Release (2008) State aid: Commission 
endorse €47 million aid to BVG in Poland¸ IP/08/1941 of 11 December 2008. 
43 State aid — Poland — State aid C 46/08 (ex N 775/07) — Large Investment Project — Aid to Dell 
Products Poland — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, OJEU No 
C25/9 of 31 January 2009. 
44 Rapid Press Release (2009) State aid: Commission approves €54.5 million investment aid to Dell 
plant in Łódź, Poland, IP/09/1348 of 23 September 2009. 
45 State aid — Germany — State aid C 34/08 (ex N 170/08) — Large investment project — Deutsche 
Solar — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, OJEU No C 217/19 
of 26 August 2008. 
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
Figure 11: Notified cases under MSF 2002 and 2007-13 Regional Aid Guidelines (€m) 
 Beneficiary Aid Investment Outcome 
2004 
FR Total 48.0 547  
IE Intel ~ ~ Withdrawn 
2005 
IE Centocor 48.3 618  
SK Getrag Ford Transmissions 53.5 265  
SK INA Kysuce 34.7 142  
2006 
DE AMD 292.5 2,354  
DE Quimonda 165.7 1,200  
DE HighSi GmbH 76.6 520  
DE Avancis 42.9 273  
DE Q-Cells 41.4 227  
DE First Solar 45.5 116  
DE Papierfabrik Adolf Jass Schwarza  36.7 265  
HU Matrai Eromu Zrt 112.5 670  
HU Hankook Tire Hungary Ltd 92.6 425  
IT Atlantica Invest AG 97.5 505  
PT About the Future 52.4 543  
PT Soporcel 63.6 187  
PT Artensa 99.3 358  
PT CELBI 89.9 319  
PT Repsol Polimeros 150.0 750  
SK Samsung 75.2 321  
2007 
DE Propapier 82.5 644  
DE Wacker Schott Solar 47.0 322  
HU IBIDEN Hungary Gyarto Kft 62.6 191 Investigation 
RO Ford Craiova 143.0 600  
2008 
DE Intico Solar 73.1 585  
DE Deutsche Solar 48.0 350 Investigation 
DE Sovello AG (formerly EverQ) 31.1 115 Investigation 
DE Flglass borde 31.5 188  
DE Masdar Solar Modules 28.6 144  
DE Ersol Thin Film GmbH 59.7 466  
DE Sunfilm AG 56.1 393  
DE Hamberger Sprenberg GmbH 40.6 250  
ES Ford  51.9 494  
HU Mercedes 111.5 548  
IT Fiat 46.0 319  
IT Digital Display 180.0 900  
PL Dell 52.7 214 Investigation 
PL BVG Medien Beteiligungs GmbH  47.0 160 Investigation 
PL Sharp 48.3 169  
2009 
IT En Plus Centrale Termoelettrica di San Severo (FG) n/a n/a  
Note: Most data are in nominal values at current prices; figures in italics are in net present value. 
Unless shown otherwise, the Commission raised no objections to the aid proposed. 
Source: Compiled from individual Commission case decisions available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1 
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Some geographical and sectoral concentrations are also worth noting. First, most countries 
have not notified any case under this mechanism; on the other hand, Germany has notified 
17 cases, followed at some distance by Portugal with five and Hungary and Italy with four 
each. At least in part this is a reflection of the largely automatic nature of the Investment 
Allowance operated in the new Länder. With such a small number of cases it is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions about any particular sectoral orientation of aid. Clearly there are 
several in the motor industry and associated activities, a number in the paper and pulp 
industries and a significant number of projects in electronics and other high-tech activities, 
within which, notably in east Germany, there appears to be a significant cluster of firms 
associated with the solar energy sector.  
5. ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The last year has been marked by government intervention in the economy on an 
unprecedented scale. The potential volume of aid authorised by the European Commission 
in the context of the crisis runs to almost one-third of EU GDP, while over the last decade, 
annual State aid expenditure has generally been around 0.6 percent of EU GDP. At times, 
the very architecture of State aid control seemed to be under threat as some called for a 
suspension of the rules in order for the effects of the crisis to be addressed. Others warned 
of the risks of protectionism policies, arguing that policy responses to the Depression 
prolonged the slump in the 1930s. The Commission cannily opted to allow intervention on 
the basis of Article 87(3)(b), enabling a parallel set of rules to operate for a temporary 
period while retaining the existing framework intact. Moreover, during this time, the 
Commission has pursued the State Aid Action Plan, effectively reaching the end of its so-
called ‘roadmap’ in mid 2009.46 
Against the backdrop of this period of turmoil, this final section aims to draw out a number 
of issues and questions as the basis for further consideration.  
(i) Perceptions of the Commission’s performance in controlling State aids 
in the crisis has been mixed, but so far broadly positive 
The nature and scale of the financial and economic crisis necessitated rapid action on the 
part of the European Commission and this, arguably on two levels. First, special measures 
were needed in order to prevent a systemic failure of the financial sector; and second, a 
commanding and quick response was required in order to preserve the authority of the 
Commission and the basic principles that underpin State aid control. 
There has been some negative comment about Commission action, with concern expressed 
at the ‘rubber-stamping’ of State aid proposals47 and claims of a ‘U-turn’ from previous 
State aid law and policy.48 In particular, concerns have been expressed at the speed with 
                                                 
46 Most elements have been addressed, but the Commission has not issued a Communication on direct 
business taxation, as indicated in the original plan. 
47 A. Bartosch (2009) ‘On competition or its leftovers’, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 2.  
48 R. D’Sa (2009) ‘“Instant” State Aid Law in a Financial Crisis – A U-Turn?’ European State Aid Law 
Quarterly, 2. 
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which some of the early decisions in the banking sector were reached and doubts cast on 
the depth of the analysis that could have been carried out in the circumstances. Other 
commentators have been more positive, arguing that the Commission “has done a 
reasonable and good job so far”49 and, sounding a more political note, suggesting that one 
of the most remarkable achievements of the Commission is that it is still in charge at all.50 
Certainly it can be argued that if the Commission had failed to act to enable Member States 
to intervene, then it would anyway have been sidelined, with serious consequences for the 
long-term credibility both of the Commission and of the principles of State aid control. 
(ii) Most commentators consider that intervention in the banking sector is 
justified; there is less consensus regarding other sectors 
Intervention in the banking sector has been justified on the basis of its particular role in the 
economy, and the consequences of its failure for all other sectors. The issues of 
‘confidence’ and ‘contagion’ are distinctive characteristics of the sector51 and justify 
special treatment: banks cannot survive a loss of confidence; the interconnected nature of 
the sector means that the collapse of one bank quickly renders others vulnerable; and the 
lubrication that banks provide to the rest of the economic system through borrowing and 
lending, both to one another and other sectors, dries up. These characteristics created a 
compelling argument for intervention to address the financial crisis.52 That said, some have 
expressed concerns over the conditions attached to restructuring of the banking sector,53 
and their implications for pan-European operations.54 It has also been argued that the 
measures have had the effect of rewarding inefficient or inept banks and encouraging other 
sectors, notably the motor industry, to seek special treatment.55 Moreover, the scale of the 
uptake of aid and its longer term implications for the sector remain unclear for the time 
being, not least since government action has reinforced the moral hazard associated with 
rescuing organisations deemed ‘too big to fail’. 
If intervention in the banking sector has largely been welcomed, more concerns have been 
expressed about State aid to other sectors. In principle, aid to other sectors under the 
Temporary Framework is restricted to firms that were not in difficulty prior to the onset of 
the crisis and were aimed at easing access to credit. However, it has been suggested that, 
if recapitalisations and loan guarantees prove too expensive to persuade banks to lend, 
then it would be preferable for governments to take active control of the banks they are 
                                                 
49 C. Koenig (2008) ‘“Instant State Aid Law” in a Financial Crisis, State of Emergency or Turmoil: Five 
Essential and Reasonable Requirements under the Rule of Law’, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 4. 
50 R. Luja (2009) ‘State Aid and Financial Crisis: Overview of the Crisis Framework,’ European State 
Aid Law Quarterly, 2. 
51 Vickers, J. (2008) ‘The Financial Crisis and Competition Policy: Some Economics’ GCP, December 
2008, available at: www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org  
52 Lyons, B. (2009) ‘Competition Policy, Bailouts and the Economic Crisis’ CCP Working Paper 09-4¸ 
University of East Anglia.  
53 Branton, G. (2009) ‘Economic Crisis and State Aid – UK Perspectives’ Romanian Competition Council 
Conference: Economic Crisis and State Aid Perspectives, 24 February. 
54 Financial Times (2009) Weber hits out at Brussels, 21 April.  
55 D’Sa, R. op cit. 
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subsidising and for loans to be decided by independent trustees, rather than for 
governments to provide subsidies directly to firms or sectors of activity.56 It has also been 
commented that the Temporary Framework diminishes the impact of the General Block 
Exemption Regulation, a core element of the State Aid Action Plan.57  
(iii) Policing State aid in other sectors, especially the motor industry, is 
likely to prove a significant challenge  
The banking sector aside, the most prominent casualty of the crisis has been the motor 
industry. Job losses and short-time working have taken place in a number of car plants and 
in the supply chain. To some extent, the sector has been sustained by the scrappage 
schemes operated in many countries, but these are not a long term solution to the 
overcapacity in the industry. Moreover, overcapacity is not the only problem facing the 
sector – the disappearance of cheap finance, demographic change and environmental 
concerns are likely to favour the production of small cars over large ones, and small car 
production is significantly less profitable.58 The scale of the sector within European 
manufacturing means that potential plant closures and restructuring have become of 
considerable domestic political importance. This is reflected in French concerns that State 
loans to Renault and Peugeot should be linked to maintaining jobs in France and in German 
government State aid commitments in the negotiations over the takeover of Opel. In both 
cases the Commission issued stern warnings, stating that French aid should not contain any 
conditions relating to the location of their activities or suppliers59 and that it would 
examine carefully whether non-commercial conditions have been attached to proposed 
German aid to Opel60 or indeed by other Member States with an interest in the future of 
the firms’ plants.61 More generally, the Commission has made much of the fact that it 
intends to scrutinise any support carefully in order to prevent ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
policies and to ensure that it stays in line with the State aid rules. 
So far, the motor industry has undergone comparatively little restructuring – especially 
given some estimates of production overcapacity running at 30 percent for car 
manufacture62 - but plant closures seem certain to be required in the medium-term. It is 
unclear how and whether government support can be provided within the constraints of the 
Temporary Framework, but the tensions between the need for a significant shake-down in 
the sector, the job implications of scaling down, the cross-border effects of subsidies 
                                                 
56 Lyons, B. op cit. 
57 D’Sa, R. op cit 
58 The Economist (2009) Trouble down the road, 19 September. 
59 Rapid Press Release (2009) State aids: the Commission obtains guarantees from the French 
government on the absence of protectionist measures in the French plan for aid to the automotive 
sector, MEMO/09/90, 28 February.  
60 Rapid Press Release (2009) Neelie Kroes European Commissioner for Competition Policy Address to 
debate on restructuring of European car industry (Opel case) Plenary session of European Parliament 
Strasbourg, 14th September 2009, Speech/09/388. 
61 Rapid Press Release (2009) State aid: Commission statement on aid for Opel Europe, MEMO/09/411, 
23 September.  
62 Financial Times (2009) A shift in gear, 19 September. 
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
offered and the respective roles of domestic authorities and the European Commission are 
already in evidence.  
(iv) The implications of the crisis for regional aid as Europe emerges from 
recession are uncertain 
With the exception of France and Germany, which made some modest policy adjustments 
to regional incentive policy, governments have not deployed regional aid as part of their 
recovery packages. In fact, most policymakers anticipated a downturn in regional aid 
expenditure commitments in 2008-09 since regional aid must be linked with investment and 
job creation – the tendency in this period has obviously been to retrench rather than 
expand.  
The likely role of regional incentives as Europe emerges from recession is unclear. In most 
western European countries, regional aid spending has seen a significant decline in the last 
decade – will this trend continue or might regional aid spending increase, especially if a still 
fragile banking sector remains averse to lending? It is plausible to suggest that regional aid 
will be subject to considerable tensions – on the one hand, public expenditure constraints 
will affect regional policy, on the other, there is likely to be increased competition for any 
mobile investment that does take place.  
(v) A ‘business as usual’ approach to regional aid control may constrain 
regional policy in the post-recession period 
The Commission’s approach to addressing the crisis has been based on a temporary 
framework that is both sectorally and spatially neutral; moreover, it has explicitly rejected 
calls for an extension of the assisted areas. So far, this response may not have constrained 
national policymakers unduly; regional incentives have not been used extensively as part of 
national recovery packages. However, as the spatial effects of the recession become 
apparent, new unemployment blackspots may emerge, creating pressure for special 
treatment of regions outside the current assisted areas; the expiry of the Temporary 
Framework may increase such pressures.  
The current Regional Aid Guidelines do not enable Member States to exceed their assisted 
area population ceilings, but would require ‘exchanging’ eligible for ineligible regions in 
order to remain within the population quota. Longer-term, the Commission’s traditional 
measures of regional disparity – GDP(PPS) per head - may prove an unsuitable guide to 
varying degrees of prosperity, not least since, if the current system is rolled forward, the 
future designation of ‘a’ regions would be based on data for a snapshot of the recession. 
(vi) The long-term implications of the economic crisis for State aid control 
are unclear 
The Commission has been astute in allowing State aid to address the crisis on the basis of 
exceptional and temporary measures, as opposed to a suspension of the standard State aid 
control framework. This has enabled it to pursue a number of outstanding elements under 
the State Aid Action Plan while allowing some flexibility for measures to address the crisis. 
At the current time, the implementation of measures and actual spending commitments 
under the Temporary Framework are unclear; in principle, Member States are to report to 
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the Commission on this by end October 2009 (and annually thereafter, as applicable),63 but 
it is not known whether these reports will ultimately be made public.  
The Temporary Framework has an end date of 31 December 2010. In principle, this should 
enable an orderly return to the standard State aid rules after that date. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the Commission will come under pressure to extend the 
Framework; there is already evidence in several Member States of the considerable 
administrative hurdles involved in establishing the relevant machinery to provide aid under 
the Framework, leading to long delays in doing so. Moreover, perceptions of the duration of 
the crisis and its impacts are likely to differ between Member States and many may be 
tempted to press for a continued relaxation of the rules.  
More generally, it remains unclear how the events of the past year will affect the role of 
governments in the market. The scale and severity of the financial and economic crisis has 
led some to a reappraisal of free market economics. Governments have been quick to 
intervene in the economy – whether in waiving merger policy to enable the Lloyds TSB 
takeover of HBOS or in their large scale systemic interventions in the banking sector. Some 
politicians have denounced the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model seen as among the root causes of the 
crisis – perhaps most notably President Sarkozy in declaring the end of the dictatorship of 
the free market.64 Others, however, have cautioned that government intervention 
exacerbates the problem, creates uncertainty and slows the market response.65 There is, it 
has been argued, a need for a broader reflection on how Member States view the role of 
State aid in their economies.66 There is also a need for the Commission to reflect on where 
its response to the crisis leaves State aid control: the ‘more economic approach’ and the 
increasingly restrictive regime of recent years arguably pushed against an open door, but 
the Commission has not so far acknowledged that the crisis challenges the ideological 
premises of the ‘more economic approach’.67 It may be optimistic to assume that ‘normal 
service will resume shortly.’  
 
                                                 
63 See point 6 of the Temporary Framework and the Commission questionnaire available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/temporary_framework_questionnaire_en.rtf> 
64 Speech in Toulon, France, 25 September 2008, available at: http://www.elysee.fr  
65 Financial Times (2009) Do not let the ‘cure’ destroy capitalism, 19 March. 
66 Ungerer, H. (2009) ‘After the State Aid Action Plan: the EU’s new State Aid Framework’, EU State 
Aid Summit – State aid policy, procedure and enforcement through the economic crisis and beyond, 
C5 Business Information in a Global Context, 23-24 June, Brussels, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_11_en.pdf  
67 Kaupa, C. (2009) ‘The More Economic approach – a Reform Based on Ideology?’ European State Aid 
Law Quarterly, 3. 
